# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

SUMMIT 6 LLC,

Plaintiff,

Case Action No. 7:14-cv-00014-O

v.

HTC CORPORATION, HTC AMERICA, INC., LG ELECTRONICS INC., LG ELECTRONICS USA, INC., LG ELECTRONICS MOBILECOMM USA, INC., MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC, and TWITTER, INC.,

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Defendants.

SUMMIT 6 LLC,

Plaintiff,

Case Action No. 7:14-cv-00106-O

v.

APPLE INC.,

Defendant.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

**DEFENDANTS' REPLY CLAIM CONSTRUCTION BRIEF** 

# **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

Cases	Page(s)
Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013)	1
Rules	
MPEP § 2173.05(e)	1

Defendants hereby address the declaration of Summit 6's expert, Dr. Mark T. Jones, and his deposition testimony, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. Dkt. No. 165.

I. "said identification" ('482 Patent, Claims 17 and 18): Dr. Jones opines that "said identification" refers to the first "identification" in claim 13, because "[i]t would make no sense for claims 17 and 18 refer to [the] unclaimed action" of "identification of a user." APX-011: ¶ 31(c); see also APX-027: 42:7-22. But Claim 13 plainly recites two different "identifications," and both could supply the required antecedent because, Dr. Jones concedes, the pre-processing parameters could be downloaded and stored before either claimed identification. See APX-024-26, 38:23-39:5, 40:15-20; APX -55-62, Exs. 3-9. Indeed, when the patentee wanted to reference the first "identification" (of digital content)—as it did in claim 13 step c—the patentee referenced it as "said received identification." Claims 17 and 18, however, do not. Under these circumstances, the term "said identification" is indefinite. See MPEP § 2173.05(e).

II. "said client device" ('482 Patent, Claim 25): Dr. Jones's opinion, which relies heavily on the prosecution history, forecloses Summit 6's attempt to correct claim 25 through claim construction. "A district court can correct a patent only if, among other things, 'the error is evident from the face of the patent." H-W Tech., L.C. v. Overstock.com, Inc., 758 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added). But Dr. Jones never opines that the error is "evident from the face of the patent." Rather, he "examin[ed] the claims, specification, and prosecution history" together in arriving at his opinion. APX-012: ¶¶ 37-40; see also Plf. Resp. Br. at 26–27. Dr. Jones's opinion therefore underscores why this court lacks authority to correct the patent. Grp. One, Ltd., 407 F.3d at 1303. Moreover, nothing prevents the patentee from claiming a different source for the pre-processing parameters in claim 25 than in other claims, e.g., claim 13, and Dr. Jones admitted he did not consider this possibility. APX-030-32: 66:10-18; 72:12-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Moreover, Dr. Jones' opinion incorrectly assumes the law does not allow a method to contemplate a step occurring that he contends as not explicitly claimed (*i.e.*, identification of a user). Dr. Jones conceded he did not know whether or not patent law permits such a claim. APX-028-9: 48:18-49:5. *It can. Mars, Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., L.P.*, 377 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (the term "comprising" does not exclude un-recited elements or method steps).

73:5. Thus, it is not reasonably certain that "said client device" means "said local device." 2

III. "media object identifier" ('557 Patent, all claims): Dr. Jones's opinions confirm that Summit 6's non-construction of "media object identifier" is improper. He admits that "media object identifier" is not a term of art, and does not exist in any computer programming language or framework of which he is aware. APX-037-39: 83:20-84:15; 85:14-17; 85:18-24. And the evidence he cites provides only shifting, functional descriptions. *See, e.g.*, APX-040-41: 86:23-87:03 (providing a graphical user interface); 86:17-23 (pre-processing). Thus, his opinions confirm that Summit 6 seeks to cover *any* structure that performs the disclosed functions, to the extent those functions can even be identified.<sup>3</sup> *See, e.g.*, APX-043-47: 91:23-93:21 (ActiveX control); 97:20-24 (Java applet); 98:10-16 (Appendix A). Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, such functional claiming is not allowed. Def. Resp. Br. at 25.

IV. "code means" ('482 Patent, Claims 20, 39): Dr. Jones's citations provide no structure for the recited function. Dr. Jones points to "the drag-and-drop embodiment or the browse and click embodiments as the capabilities that allow the receipt of an identification." APX-52: 113:1–7. These capabilities, however, describe only how a user interacts with the media object identifier—not how the software performs the function of receiving an identification. Defs. Op. Br. 29–30. Instead, Dr. Jones testified that "[t]he ActiveX framework would provide you with [an] event, and then it would be the programmer's responsibility for . . . what they wanted to do in response to a drag-and-drop event." APX-045: 93:14–21. But Summit 6 "cannot rely on the knowledge of one skilled in the art to fill in the gaps." Defendants' Resp. Br. 31 (quoting Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Ultimately, Dr. Jones's "structures" are black boxes that perform functions in undisclosed ways, rendering this means-plus-function claim element indefinite. 4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Dr. Jones admitted that he did not even consider whether the purported error was the inclusion of "*said* client device" in place of "*a* client device," and further admitted that, if it was, this would change the claim's scope. APX-033-34: 75:24-76:21; APX-035-36: 78:19-79:6. Thus, Dr. Jones cannot be reasonably certain that his alleged error is the correct one.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Dr. Jones's testimony also confirms that a person of skill could not derive a definitive list of required features or capabilities from the intrinsic record. APX-042-43, 48-50: 90:03-91:14; 102:19-104:20, esp. 104:12-20.

<sup>4</sup> See APX-049-54: 112:3-113:07 (media object identifier); 119:20-120:7 (Figs. 1 and 2); 121:17-122:9 (Fig. 4).

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Respectfully submitted,

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# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 3rd day of February 2015, all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document through the Court's CM/ECF system pursuant to Local Rule 5.1(d).

s/ Philip Ou